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Executive summary
 Nord Stream 2  (NS2) would lead to a sizeable capacity 
increase of the gas route connecting Russia and Germany. 
This paper examines the economic, strategic, legal and 
political implications of NS2 from an EU perspective.  
The paper draws the following conclusions.
q  Assessing the commercial rationale of NS2 based 
on prospects for EU gas demand is risky because of 
the poor reliability of past projections. Under some 
scenarios, EU gas imports are set to increase in short 
to medium term, notably to compensate declining 
domestic production. The EU relies, however, on a 
vast spare import capacity, which suggests there is 
no urgent need for additional import infrastructures 
(but those required to meet the EU’s competition and 
energy security objectives).
q  The commercial rationale for NS2 becomes more 
evident within the framework of Russia’s geo-economic 
ambitions. A battle for EU market shares is likely to 
ensue between Russian gas and liquefied natural gas 
(LNG). NS2 would enable Gazprom to tame rising 
competition from LNG and avoid reliance on Ukraine 
for the transit of its gas production – a longstanding 
Russian geopolitical objective. 
q  The impact of NS2 on prices and competition will 
hinge on Gazprom’s marketing strategy. Under 
certain conditions, NS2 could expose the EU to a 
fragmentation of its internal energy market and the 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) to 
higher costs to access Western short-term markets. 
Proper implementation of the EU’s internal market 
rules remains a pre-condition to reduce the risk of 
market segmentation associated with Nord Stream 2.
q  Considering the benign market conditions and 
the EU’s improved regulatory framework and 
infrastructure developments, NS2 is unlikely to  
pose a direct threat to the Union’s overall energy 
security. But NS2 would turn CEECs into end 
consumers, depriving them of the energy security 
that comes with their current transit role. In the 
EU, market and solidarity mechanisms could help 
to mitigate the risks. The concentration of sizeable 
capacity on a single route calls for contingency plans 
that would need the Ukrainian network to remain 
sufficiently operational. 
q  The impact of NS2 on route diversification will also 
hinge on Gazprom’s marketing strategy. Uncertainty 
regarding Gazprom’s stance will likely induce 
prudence among private investors. Public resources 
may have to step in to invest in infrastructures that 
are needed for the sake of competition or energy 
security. Only careful planning will ensure that 
consumers benefit from a net positive welfare effect. 
q  The applicability of the Third Energy Package (TEP) to 
the offshore section of NS2 remains contested. In an 
attempt to fill this gap, the Commission is proposing 
to extend the EU’s Gas Directive to all import 
pipelines and is asking member states for a mandate 
to negotiate an intergovernmental agreement with 
Russia. The unanimous and robust backing of these 
initiatives by EU member states would provide an 
opportunity to push Russia to align its legislation, at 
least in part, with the EU’s objectives.
q  Even if the NS2 operational framework were to fall 
under the EU’s regulatory regime, the pipeline would 
remain politically problematic. Its mere prospect 
has tilted the strategic balance between Ukraine and 
Russia in favour of the latter, nurtured mistrust among 
EU member states, and created tensions between 
the EU and the US. Germany’s final recognition of 
the political problems associated with the pipeline 
translated in the suggestion that some level of gas 
transit through Ukraine should be maintained. 
However, it is not clear how this can be guaranteed.
q  Even if the EU makes use of its regulatory means to 
cope with the political problems associated with NS2, 
member states still have the final word. Enduring 
misalignments in the energy preferences of member 
states hampers the EU’s international actorness and 
exposes some member states to the political leverage  
of third countries.
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List of recommendations
The European Union and its member states must:
1    Confront the risks of market segmentation associated with Nord Stream 2 as a result of 
the congestion of west-east pipelines. The EU 
and its members should fully implement the 
liberalisation framework included in the Third 
Energy Package.
2   Adopt a radical integration approach when revising the gas market design in 2020.
3   Ensure that CEECs can rely on sufficient options. Should investments in new 
infrastructures aimed at spurring competition, 
reinforcing energy security or de-congesting the 
west-east corridor be made more expensive as 
a result of NS2, the countries enjoying positive 
welfare effects from the new pipeline should 
be required to invest part of it to support 
infrastructural upgrade in those countries which 
are expected to suffer losses.
4   Encourage, where necessary, regional pooling of gas purchase in CEECs to negotiate better  
contractual conditions with Gazprom. Such a  
re-negotiation opportunity would emerge with the 
change of delivery point resulting from NS2. 
5   Perform new energy security stress tests on the assumption of the construction of NS2.
6    Focus diversification efforts on intra-EU interconnections and flexible, small-scale LNG 
import facilities in the most vulnerable sections  
of the internal market.
7   Give the Commission a mandate to negotiate  the operating regime for new pipelines and support 
the review of the Gas Directive to clarify the 
operational regime of pipelines connecting the 
EU with third countries. To bridge divisions among 
member states, agree to an ‘internal energy bargain’ 
that should include: i) the full opening of national 
markets in alignment with the Third Energy 
Package, ii) an enhanced role for the EU in external 
energy relations.
8   Subject any approval of NS2 to Russia’s fulfilment of the Minsk II requirements.
9   Make the continuation of the Ukrainian route an attractive option for all stakeholders by 
pushing for lower transit tariffs and the full 
alignment with EU legislation.
10   Include large gas import projects in the National Energy and Climate Plans, foreseen by the Energy 
Union Governance Regulation proposal, to boost 
consultation on large gas import projects. Give the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER) an arbiter role. 
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Introduction
  In September 2015, Russian gas firm Gazprom 
signed a shareholder agreement with five European 
companies – E.on (now Uniper), Royal Dutch Shell, 
OMV, Wintershall, and Engie – for the doubling of the 
Nord Stream pipeline. The expansion, named Nord 
Stream 2 (NS2), would follow the same route and add 
55 bcm of annual capacity to the current infrastructure. 
NS2 is expected to carry gas from the Yamal peninsula 
(Bovanenkovo field) to the European Union (EU).  
The 1200 km-long route would start in the Narva Bay 
and continue through the Baltic Sea in the exclusive 
economic zones of Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and 
Germany, and the coastal waters of Denmark and 
Germany, until the landing point in Greifswald, Germany. 
 According to recent estimates, the total cost of 
the pipeline would amount to EUR 9.5 bn. Originally, 
Gazprom was supposed to hold a 50% majority stake in 
the project, while the five other partners would get 10% 
each. However, the European firms withdrew from the 
consortium after the Polish antitrust authority declared 
it would potentially challenge NS2. They remained, 
however, supportive of the project as investors. Currently, 
NS2 AG, the Swiss-based project company created for the 
planning, construction, and operation of the pipeline, is 
wholly owned by Gazprom.
 For the EU, the announcement of NS2 came 
at a delicate moment. Politically, the pipeline 
goes against several of the objectives of the 
Energy Union, a flagship initiative of the Juncker 
Commission. Economically, it will cement 
Gazprom’s dominant position in the eastern parts 
of the EU market, and give Gazprom a competitive 
advantage over newcomers, notably in the liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) market. Geopolitically, it could 
deprive Ukraine of its transit role, a strategic asset 
and an important source of financial resources. As 
such, NS2 is at odds with the EU’s commitment to 
support the country following Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea and continued support to separatist 
forces. To date, the European Commission (EC), a 
majority of MEPs in the European Parliament, and 
several EU member states have openly criticised 
this pipeline. 
 This Issue Paper intends to address the market, 
strategic, legal, and political issues raised by NS2 
from an EU perspective. It will first assess its likely 
impact on the EU’s gas market dynamics. Second, it 
will explore its direct and indirect effects on the EU’s 
energy security. Third, it will discuss the main legal 
and political issues related to the pipeline.
1. A market perspective
 An infrastructure as massive as NS2 is set to bring 
about a sizeable alteration of the EU’s gas imports and 
the functioning of its Internal Energy Market (IEM). 
This section discusses the pipeline’s business rationale, 
assesses its risks for EU gas markets and presents ways 
to mitigate them. It starts by examining the need for 
additional capacity in light of the trends for EU gas 
demand. It then considers the pipeline extension against 
Gazprom’s strategic options. Finally, it explores the 
potential impacts of NS2 on the EU’s internal market.
1.1  DOES THE EU NEED MORE GAS?
 Gas demand modelling is a daunting task. It needs 
to factor in the growing weight of the decarbonisation 
agenda in energy policy, heightened market volatility, 
the disrupting impact of technological developments, 
unpredictable consumer preferences, and unstable 
economic cycles. As a result, European demand has  
often been overestimated in the past. Between 2006  
and 2014, forecasts by the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) for EU gas demand in 2030 have been revised 
downwards five consecutive times from 560 to 390 bcm.1 
Between 2003 and 2013, the EC changed its forecasts for 
2030 six times from 620 to 400 bcm.2
term, the trend towards demand reduction, increased 
deployment of renewable energy sources (RES), and the 
use of new gas sources (LNG) will offset the phasing out of 
coal and nuclear capacity and the reduction of domestic 
gas production.
 What is more readily predictable is the rate of 
domestic depletion of gas resources in the EU. In the 
Netherlands and the UK, gas production fell respectively 
by 34.6% and 40% between 2006 and 2016. The decline 
in the supply from the Netherlands is likely to accelerate 
as a result of the intensification of seismic events in 
Groningen and rising public pressure to close the field.5 
Norway and Algeria, which respectively accounted for 
36.6% and 13.8% of EU gas imports in 2016, have seen 
their production grow only slightly between 2006 and 
2016 (British Petroleum 2017). The outlook for exports 
appears constrained in the long run, either by commercial 
risk in Norway (Hall 2018) or booming domestic demand 
in Algeria.
 The IEA has drawn various scenarios for the EU over the 
period 2020-2040 (IEA 2017). Most anticipate that EU gas 
imports will increase in the short-to-medium term because 
of declining domestic production. Consequently, Gazprom 
and LNG providers are set to battle for additional 
European market shares. In the long run, Europe intends 
to become a carbon-free economy, which may call into 
question the need for an expansion of gas pipelines.
 The EU already relies on a vast import capacity that  
is likely to exceed any projected demand increase (Fig. 1  
and 2 on page 7). In 2016, EU gas imports amounted to 310.6 
bcm against 700 bcm of import capacity (BP 2017). Even if 
the current oversupply of LNG comes to an end – as many 
predict it will as a result of the forthcoming expansion of 
Asian demand – Russia could fill in the gaps thanks to the 
existing network of pipelines (provided they are adequately 
maintained). Against this backdrop, it seems that 
Gazprom’s commercial motives for expanding its export 
capacity to Europe are only partly based on the EU’s gas 
demand projections.
1.2  THE COMMERCIAL INTEREST OF GAZPROM
 To understand the decision to build additional 
capacity, one must consider the project in the context of 
Gazprom’s economic predicament. Over the past decade, 
Gazprom faced rapidly evolving market conditions, due to 
structural and cyclical factors.
 On the structural side, LNG brought flexibility and 
competition in gas markets. For a long time, gas had been 
traded regionally, with stiff contractual formulas reflecting 
the rigidity of pipeline trading and the geophysical 
characteristics of gas. Investments used to require exclusive 
and sustained relations between buyers and sellers.  
Security of demand has been guaranteed by destination 
The open question about the future is the 
extent to which, in the short-to-medium 
term, the trend towards demand reduction, 
increased deployment of renewable energy 
sources (RES), and the use of new gas 
sources (LNG) will offset the phasing out of 
coal and nuclear capacity.
 In the specific markets to be serviced by NS2, there 
has been a downward trend in gas consumption since 
2006. Sluggish growth, the subsidised penetration of 
renewables in the energy mix, efficiency gains, and an 
underperforming carbon pricing scheme (which made 
coal more competitive than gas) have contributed to a 
demand drop of 10.7% in Central Western Europe3 and  
of 5.9% in Central Eastern Europe (CEE)4.
 Between 2006 and 2016, all countries in these regions 
have experienced a reduction in gas demand (except 
Poland). Nevertheless, small signals of demand recovery 
have appeared since 2014. The open question about the 
future is the extent to which, in the short-to-medium 
6
and Take-or-Pay clauses, while pricing has been, and 
still is, indexed to the prices of oil products. Recently, 
technological innovations have removed some of the 
rigidities by reducing the costs of the liquefaction, 
regasification and storage of gas. Arbitrage possibilities 
have emerged between different regional markets. 
Heightened international competition has spurred global 
price convergence. Short-term, spot trading indexed on 
gas-to-gas competition (rather than oil) for uncontracted 
gas have now developed in mature markets, thus putting 
traditional business models under pressure.
 On the cyclical side, shale gas production in North 
America has expanded from 524 to 749.2 bcm between 
2006 and 2016. So has the global liquefaction capacity, 
which is expected to rise by 200 bcm between 2014 
and 2020 (Fig.3 on page 8). At the same time, sluggish 
demand has exerted downward pressures on spot market 
prices in North-Western Europe (NWE). Moreover, the 
EU has become a more contestable market as a result of 
regulatory changes and an upgrade in infrastructure.
 In 2009, it adopted the Third Energy Package, a 
legislation foreseeing the separation of ownership 
and use of gas infrastructure and the access of third 
parties to facilitate competition in the internal market. 
More recently, the Directorate General for Competition 
investigated abusive market practices allegedly perpetrated 
by Gazprom in Eastern Europe. Following an antitrust 
proceeding against Gazprom in 2018, the Russian firm 
accepted to align its contractual practices in Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEECs) with EU legislation to 
avoid a fine amounting to 10% of its turnover.6
  Finally, Europeans have raised their regasification 
capacity to 210 bcm in 2016. The ratio between used 
and overall capacity amounted to 23.1%. The enhanced 
interconnection of regional wholesale markets 
throughout the EU encouraged the emergence of gas hubs 
at trading points, reflecting the short-term equilibrium 
between supply and demand. This interconnection has 
The EU already relies on a vast import 
capacity, which is likely to exceed any 
future demand increase. Against this 
backdrop, it seems that Gazprom’s 
commercial motives for expanding its 
export capacity to Europe are only partly 
based on the EU’s gas demand projections.
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reduced the share of gas traded under long-term,  
oil-indexed contracts. The percentage of hub pricing in 
EU gas trading has risen from 15% to 64% between 2005 
and 2015, albeit unevenly: hub trading has reached 92.1% 
in NWE (Fig.4 above), while it remains below 10% in the 
less connected parts of South-Eastern Europe. Still, the EU 
antitrust proceeding will help the most isolated and captive 
gas regions in Eastern Europe to buy at conditions similar 
to those of the most open and contestable markets in NWE.
 The combination of these factors has challenged 
Gazprom’s business model, which relied on long-term 
contracts (LTCs), take-or-pay conditions7 (ToP), restrictive 
territorial clauses8, indexation to oil product prices, 
and preferred relations with large national European 
midstream buyers (Giuli 2015; Franza 2016).
 In response to the new market environment, 
Gazprom has moved from defending prices to protecting 
market shares. Although it did not fully embrace hub 
pricing (adopted by suppliers such as Equinor and Gas Terra), 
the Russian firm has been commercially aggressive. It has 
negotiated several discounts, introduced partial spot pricing, 
and lowered, on an individual basis, the minimum offtake 
requirement for midstream buyers in Western Europe.9 
(Franza 2016). Between 2008 and 2015, the average 
price of Russian gas at the EU border10 has fallen from 
14.50 to 6.17 USD/Mbtu, thus aligning with Western 
hub prices (Fig.5 on page 9).
 Gazprom has also begun auction selling limited 
quantities of non-contracted gas at the German 
border via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline.11 It is 
unlikely, however, to be enough to signal an intent 
to move away from LTCs (Boussena and Locatelli 
2017). Finally, under the pressure of the EU’s 
competition watchdog,12 Gazprom has conceded to 
end its discriminatory practices in Eastern Europe, 
and to mainstream the conditions it offered to 
Western European buyers (Stern and Yafimava 
2017). This adaptive approach has proven successful. 
Although a sizeable share of Gazprom’s revenues 
has slipped,13 the company has managed to 
consolidate its position in the EU market, 
accounting for 33.9% of gas demand in 2016, slightly 
above its 2006 share (Fig.6 on page 9).
 Russia has valuable assets to confront a 
more competitive gas landscape. First, Russian 
gas production costs are lower than those of its 
SHARE OF HUB-LINKED GAS TO TRADED VOLUMES
Main regions of the Internal Energy Market
Source: Author on data from platts.com, May 2016
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competitors. Second, it relies on an already developed and 
amortised network of pipelines (amounting to an export 
capacity of 176 bcm through Ukraine, Belarus, and Nord 
Stream 1) whose costs are sunk.
 To date, Gazprom’s spare production capacity is 
estimated between 100 and 150 bcm/year, as a result of 
past overinvestment, lower-than-expected European 
demand, and rising domestic competition from other gas 
producers such as Rosneft’ and Novatek. Considering the 
volumes, Gazprom could quickly become the price 
reference on spot markets if it were to abandon LTCs 
and fully embrace spot trading (Franza 2016). 
 With NS2, Gazprom would have the possibility to 
flood NWE markets with cheap gas. Gazprom could  
aspire to set the reference price for the marginal costs  
of developing LNG, which the Russian company  
considers as its forthcoming top competitor (Boussena 
and Locatelli 2017). NS2 would also help Russia to  
pursue its marketing strategy without the rigidities 
associated to the Ukrainian route – such as transit  
fees and physical bottlenecks – which could prevent 
Gazprom from reacting promptly to changing conditions 
in global markets.
1.3   PRICES AND COMPETITION IN THE EU GAS 
MARKET: DIVERGING VIEWS
 As long as the excess in LNG supply (in the  
short-to-medium term) forces Gazprom to keep 
rates low, NS2 will lower costs in the NWE market 
zones. The German and Austrian market areas would 
then benefit from NS2: it would increase their liquidity, 
strengthen their hubs, and preserve and expand their 
distribution role at a time when maritime trading of  
LNG is set to challenge their continental centrality. 
Source: Author on data from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2017
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 As for the other market zones to be serviced by NS2, 
notably the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, 
there is no consensus on the potential impact on 
prices and competition.
 The fact that Gazprom’s future marketing strategy 
remains unknown can partly explain such a lack of 
consensus. Whether Gazprom will re-route LTCs from  
the Ukraine-Europe route to NS2 or will instead switch  
to spot markets will have different consequences for the 
CEE markets.
 The first possibility is that long-term flows 
currently routed through Ukraine will be  
re-routed via NS2, thus generating congestion  
at the interconnection points between western  
Europe and CEECs. This re-routing would reduce  
the capacity of CEE countries to access non-Russian  
gas traded on western short-term markets. Under this 
scenario, CEECs would risk becoming a captive market  
for Gazprom and thus exposed to higher prices. Some 
predict that NS2 would prompt congestion at the  
Czech-Slovak and the Slovak-Hungarian connections  
by 2020, leaving almost no capacity available for  
short-term deliveries from the West (Kotek et al.  
2017). Similarly, LTCs could take up half of the  
capacity of the German-Austrian connection,  
which would have been entirely open to near-term 
deliveries otherwise. 
 The least impacted pipeline would be the  
Austrian-Hungarian one where, according to the  
authors, LTC booking would rise from 59% to 75%.  
In March 2017, Gazprom procured downstream  
capacity until 2039 from the entry point in Greifswald 
to the Czech-Slovak border (EPSC 2017), allegedly 
confirming its intention to re-route a sizeable part  
of its guaranteed contracted exports.
 Investment in additional west-east capacity 
would be needed to guarantee adequate levels of 
diversification and competition in CEECs (Zachmann 
2017). This additional investment (estimated at  
EUR 1 bn) would be unnecessary in case NS2 is not  
built (Kotek et al. 2017). The resulting additional 
capacity is likely to cause either a lock-in – potentially 
contradicting the EU’s decarbonisation objectives – or 
asset stranding in either NS2 or other infrastructure. 
In the latter case, European taxpayers or consumers 
would have to bear the cost. Apart from infrastructural 
adaptation, other instruments for risk mitigation 
would be the EU antitrust discipline – which has 
already proven effective in targeting discriminatory 
practices. Also, a change in the delivery points of 
existing contracts may be an opportunity for several 
CEECs clients to renegotiate contractual terms at more 
favourable conditions – i.e. by asking for a reduction of 
ToP levels.
 The second option is a phase-out of long-term 
contracts in a future that would be dominated by 
dynamic pricing based on gas-to-gas competition 
in a seamless European internal market. NS2 gas 
sold on the German GASPOOL hub might, in this 
case, outprice gas coming from Ukraine in CEECs’ 
market under LTCs, potentially benefitting traders to 
the detriment of CEECs mid-stream incumbents. It is 
probably under this condition that NS2 could contribute 
to the emergence of a more integrated – although 
Germany-centred – gas market in CEECs. If LNG is the 
price setting supply in the EU, the expansion of Russian 
capacity would permanently exert a downward pressure 
on the LNG import prices in both tight14 and loose15 
LNG market conditions, benefitting the EU-27 overall 
(Hecking and Weiser 2017). This could, however, happen 
in a fully liberalised and interconnected EU market,16 
the benefits of which are not yet entirely on display in 
the CEE region, partly due to slow implementation of 
the Third Energy Package (Goldthau 2016).17 
A rush to renationalisation as well as 
command and control policies in gas 
markets in CEECs would be a likely 
outcome of NS2. Prospects for EU 
integration in gas markets would thus 
further diminish. 
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 However, a scenario in which NS2 pushes CEECs 
towards liberalisation of their gas sectors and further 
integration with the rest of the internal market 
does not look entirely convincing. Countries such as 
Poland attribute a great deal of political significance 
to the reduction of imports from Russia. NS2 might 
push Poland or other CEECs towards even more 
interventionist policies and centralised control over 
their gas sector. In reaction to NS2, CEECs could 
embark on exclusive and potentially expensive LTCs 
with alternative suppliers (i.e. Qatar or the US). In the 
name of security considerations or requirements of 
geographical origin, they could remove flexibility from 
the system and consolidate fragmentation. In 2009, 
Polish incumbent PGNiG signed a 20 years contract 
with Qatargas, whose deliveries started in 2014, while 
a doubling of agreed volumes was signed in 2017.18 
The agreed price was not disclosed, but the procedure 
signals Warsaw’s focus on the geographical origin of 
gas, rather than on the contractual scheme. It should 
be considered that if LNG provides competition and 
flexibility, it mainly does it by way of short-term 
markets and uncontracted gas. All this seems to 
demonstrate the unlikelihood that NS2 could  
favour integration. 
 A rush to renationalisation as well as command and 
control policies in gas markets in CEECs would be a 
likely outcome of NS2. Prospects for EU integration in 
gas markets would thus further diminish.
1.4  RECOMMENDATIONS
 The prospects for EU gas demand seem too  
uncertain to justify a sizeable increase of Nord  
Stream’s capacity. Russia would be able to comply  
with its long-term contractual commitments through  
the existing infrastructure (if it is adequately 
maintained). But EU demand prospects are not the sole 
rationale for extending NS2. 
 Over the years, Gazprom has been facing many 
challenges, from rising competition to shrinking 
EU demand and price erosion. However, the firm 
successfully managed to keep its market shares by 
introducing elements of flexibility in its long-term 
contracts, thereby aligning LTC prices with hub prices  
on NWE trading platforms. 
 NS2 would enable Gazprom to pursue multiple 
commercial purposes at once. Through a volume-driven 
strategy, it could defend or even expand its market 
shares and fend off the growing competition stemming 
from LNG. Gazprom could also enhance its ability to 
spread uncertainty in the market, potentially deterring 
final investment decisions in rival projects. Last but not 
least, it could comply with LTC commitments regardless 
of what happens in Ukraine.
 From an EU perspective, the flow diversion 
prompted by NS2 would benefit a few EU member 
states – notably Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and 
France (and their energy operators) – at the expense of 
others, notably in Central and Eastern Europe. Whether 
the aggregate impact of NS2 will be zero-sum or 
positive will depend on Gazprom’s marketing strategy. 
In case of a re-routing of LTCs to Nord Stream, CEECs 
are likely to suffer from a constrained access to Western 
short-term markets, which will result in persistent 
market concentration and high prices in the region. 
A shift towards more flexible contractual schemes 
(and removal of the remaining regulatory or physical 
bottlenecks) would enable regional markets to spread 
the benefits of competition to all consumers – including 
in CEE.
 Regardless of the strategy, the company will follow, 
NS2 is likely to consolidate its market position and  
grant the company an additional competitive advantage 
vis-à-vis potential competitors. 
 Minimising potential abuses of such a privileged  
position would require the following actions to be taken 
by Europeans:
 
1 q Ensure correct and full implementation of 
mechanisms aimed at managing congestion and 
preventing capacity hoarding. The EU should 
ensure the full implementation of the Third Energy 
Package and strengthen the legal framework for 
the auctioning of short-term trading capacity. 
Despite advancements in the removal of physical 
and regulatory bottlenecks, the situation remains 
imbalanced. Congestion Management Procedures 
aimed at preventing contractual congestion, have 
often been implemented too slowly.19 A relevant 
example is Poland, which despite a sufficient 
connection with GASPOOL and the Czech hub, and 
a high price premium on the day-ahead market 
for adjacent price zones, shows high levels of 
spare cross-border capacity and missed arbitrage 
opportunities. This situation results from the 
insufficient liberalisation of the Polish gas market.
2 q Adopt a more systemic or radical integration 
approach when revising the gas market 
design in 2020 (should the first action prove 
insufficient). The current system implies a 
voluntary market merger process of national 
gas trading zones. If this process does not lead 
to pan-EU gas price convergence due to the 
persistence of barriers such as cross-border tariffs, 
lack of interconnectors, physical and contractual 
congestion at interconnection points, alternative 
solutions should be considered. These should 
include the evolution towards a centrally organised 
gas market operated by a single transmission system 
operator (TSO) and overseen by a single regulator. 
A uniform tariff system should replace the current 
cross-border tariff system based on entry and exit 
between national market zones. The current system 
provides incentives for member states to compete 
for an entry point, thus giving leverage to external 
suppliers to divide clients. Should these proposals be 
found as moving towards a politically unacceptable 
level of centralisation, more nuanced advancements 
of integration can also be considered. At a minimum, 
however, they should aim to strengthen regional 
cooperation and limit the ability of foreign suppliers 
to segment the Internal Energy Market.
3 q Ensure that CEECs can rely on various options. 
By 2020, the infrastructure that will enable CEECs 
to rely on at least three different energy sources 
should be complete. Of particular importance are 
the Bulgaria-Serbia interconnector and the BRUA 
pipeline (4.4 bcm), which connects Bulgaria to 
Austria. These pipelines would thus connect CEEC 
demand with supply from the south through the 
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) or the Bulgaria-
Greece Interconnector (IBG), which is linked to the 
Greek regasification terminal of Alexandroupolis. 
Should CEECs be completely cut off from access 
to the western short-term market because of NS2 
and should this translate into unfairly segmented 
Should CEECs be completely cut off 
from access to the western short-term 
market because of NS2 and should this 
translate into unfairly segmented pricing, 
compensation mechanisms should apply. 
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2. An energy security perspective
 The EU has traditionally framed energy insecurity 
as a market failure to be addressed by institutions 
ensuring that markets provide energy to consumers 
at a price as close as possible to the marginal cost. 
However, since the 2004 enlargement to a group of 
countries particularly exposed to Gazprom’s dominant 
position, and the supply disruptions that occurred in 2006 
and 2009 due to pricing disputes between Gazprom and 
Ukraine’s Naftogaz, energy security started developing  
as a specific template in EU’s energy policy, especially after 
the Lisbon Treaty (2007) formalised the shared ownership 
of EU energy policy between the institutions and the 
member states.
 In 2010, the EU adopted a Regulation on Gas 
Security20  which established a framework for emergency 
cooperation and facilitated investments in reverse 
flows (standing at about 147 bcm capacity in CEE), 
regasification (holding at 210 bcm capacity in 2016,  
with more than 150 bcm of unused capacity), and  
storage capacity. 
 In 2014, the EU adopted an Energy Security Strategy,21  
which went beyond the long-standing objective of 
route and supplier diversification. It took a broader 
approach that addressed demand reduction, the full 
implementation of the internal market, the development 
of domestic resources, and the support of renewables as 
factors for improving energy security. Stress tests22 held 
in 2014 revealed an improvement in resilience overall, 
although some vulnerabilities persist in South-East 
Europe (SEE).
 In 2017, within the framework of the Energy Union, 
the EU adopted a solidarity principle. It foresees  
cross-border assistance if a supply shock occurs.23  
pricing, compensation mechanisms should apply. 
‘Winner’ countries could earmark part of their 
consumer surplus to fund the expansion of west-
east corridors. Where related costs seem excessive 
compared to the potential local welfare losses as a 
result of NS2, alternative solutions include demand 
reduction – at least for the portion of the market 
that is at risk of remaining captive as a result of 
NS2. It would also be more consistent with the EU’s 
climate objective to re-route investment towards RES 
deployment, energy efficiency, and renewable gas.
4 q Encourage, where necessary, regional pooling 
of gas purchase. Cartels of CEEC buyers could 
do this. The idea of joint purchases was originally 
put forward by the President of the European 
Council, Donald Tusk, in his early formulation of 
the Energy Union concept. The ambition was to 
establish a public purchasing agency on the same 
basis as Euratom for uranium purchase. The final 
Energy Union Communication, however, watered 
down the concept but mentioned the possibility for 
private companies to proceed with joint purchasing 
on a voluntary basis, a system already adopted by 
Japanese importers to curb the price of LNG imports. 
Although the different deadlines of Gazprom’s 
LTCs might become an obstacle, the re-routing 
resulting from the construction of NS2 could be an 
opportunity for a collective renegotiation on more 
favourable terms.
 This chapter focused on the market dimension of 
NS2. While some member states believe that the mere 
implementation of the EU internal market principles 
would lead to price convergence, others do not 
fundamentally consider pricing mechanisms as useful 
instruments to deliver energy security. We will examine 
this issue in the next section.
The package also enhances the Commission’s role in the 
ex-ante evaluation of intergovernmental agreements on  
gas supply.24
2.1   IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN  
ENERGY SECURITY
 Thanks to recent and planned infrastructure and 
regulatory plans, the possibility of a severe supply 
disruption in the EU looks increasingly remote, 
especially in a context of benign market conditions.
 Current spare import capacity largely exceeds 
supply – including from Russia – and will probably 
continue to do so in any future demand scenario. If 
correctly implemented, the EU Congestion Management 
Procedures will guarantee that any unused booked 
capacity (e.g. as a result of a politically motivated supply 
interruption) would be lost to competitors. Thus, if 
Russia were to intentionally or accidentally interrupt 
supply, it would be damaging for itself. Under the 
solidarity provisions, any cut-off of gas delivery to CEECs 
would oblige Germany to provide emergency supply to 
its eastern neighbours as a measure of last resort. By 
spreading the costs of gas cut-offs throughout Europe, 
such a provision limits the possibility for Russia to apply 
coercive practices to specific segments of the IEM.
 Anyway, the current priority for Russia is to keep 
market shares and find an outlet for its production 
overcapacity. For that purpose, it has to convince 
clients about its reliability (despite the geopolitical 
uncertainties). It should be taken into consideration that 
Russia has so far failed in finding additional markets, and 
cannot, therefore, sell its production elsewhere. Finally, 
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in the context of the decarbonisation agenda, natural 
gas is less and less seen as a climate-compatible fuel for 
the medium to long run. Thus, any supply interruption 
could end up undermining the confidence in natural 
gas as a secure and affordable source and contribute 
to accelerating EU efforts towards reducing demand and 
moving towards alternative sources.
 In the end, NS2 does not fundamentally alter the 
energy security predicament of the EU, since it does 
not necessarily reduce the EU’s import capacity.
 Framing energy insecurity as a simple matter 
of import capacity, however, is a narrow approach. 
It fails to take into consideration the geopolitical 
considerations and the enduring imperfections of the 
EU gas markets. Even in a relaxed market environment, 
energy can serve as a political tool. By moving its entry 
point from Ukraine to Germany, Russia will no longer 
depend on transit through CEECs to supply western 
European markets, making the former strategically 
more vulnerable (Riley 2016; Dudek 2017). Past events 
have fuelled mistrust. In the last months of the USSR, 
the Kremlin cut off oil to crush independence protests 
in the Baltics. Between 1991 and 2004, there were 
at least 40 politically motivated oil and gas delivery 
interruptions, mainly targeting post-Soviet countries 
such as Lithuania, Georgia, Belarus, and Turkmenistan 
(Larsson 2016). In 2014, Gazprom’s supplies to several 
EU operators were reduced, raising questions about 
Russia’s motivations ahead of a critical EU decision  
on the onshore ramification of Nord Stream, OPAL 
(Loskot-Strachota 2014).
 With the construction of NS2, other security 
concerns may arise, especially as Russia would end up 
concentrating on a single route a disproportionate 
part of its exports to the EU. The full capacity of an 
expanded Nord Stream would amount to more than 
25% of EU gas consumption. It would, therefore, be 
in the interest of both the EU and Russia to foresee 
contingency re-routing if necessary (including  
through Ukraine).
2.2  THE IMPACT OF NS2 ON DIVERSIFICATION
 One of the main pillars of the EU’s actorness in the 
field of energy security is the Union’s support for gas 
route and supplier diversification. Efforts have accelerated 
since the gas crises of 2006 and 2009, and specific gas 
provinces to reach out in the EU’s geographical vicinities 
are mentioned in key documents such as the Energy 
Union and the Energy Diplomacy Action Plan of 2015.  
As such, a relevant question is what kind of impact  
Nord Stream 2 would have in the EU’s efforts to diversify 
its gas supplies.
 NS2 (as a capacity extension that will allow a  
supplier to flood the outlet market) can intuitively 
be discouraging for competitors, and decrease the 
motivation to build up alternative capacity. In this  
regard, Gazprom has often used communication to 
deter interest in diversification projects.
 The announcement of the South Stream project 
in 2007, for instance, aimed at hampering EU and US-
backed efforts to ship Caspian gas to South East Europe. 
Russia is now playing a similar game concerning the 
landing point of the second string of Turkish Stream. It 
entertains uncertainty as to whether the final destination 
will be Turkey or Bulgaria.25 More generally, the Russian 
government’s claims on a forthcoming era of low prices26 
and abundant export capacity are also part of the same 
tactic to delay decisions or discourage investment in 
rival infrastructures (notably LNG) and thus reduce 
competition in the medium-to-long term. In a nutshell, 
Warnings from the Russian government 
about a forthcoming era of low prices,  
together with the announcement of  
new capacity aim at delaying or 
discouraging investment decisions on  
rival infrastructures.
Gazprom is replicating in gas markets the successful 
communication strategy implemented by Saudi Arabia 
in oil markets. Causing price volatility and retaining 
crucial information from the market can deter energy 
investments (Boussena and Locatelli 2017). 
 Even if additional export capacity for Russian gas 
is not good news for alternative routes, the EU’s poor 
record in gas diversification has other political and 
commercial motivations. 
 For example, the long-standing ambitions of the 
Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) – a flagship EU initiative 
aimed at importing gas from the Caspian, the Gulf and 
the Middle East – have translated so far into the modest 
capacity of the TAP-TANAP pipeline as - contrary to the 
initial expectations – Azerbaijan is set to be the only gas 
provider to the corridor. By 2020, the TAP-TANAP route 
will channel only about 8-10 bcm of Azeri gas to the final 
landing point in Italy. Paradoxically, its expansion may 
even end up carrying Russian gas, once the Russia-Turkey 
TurkStream pipeline is complete.
 Today, the EastMed pipeline – a Project of Common 
Interest aimed at linking the Israeli and Cypriot 
offshore fields to Europe – is being challenged by more 
commercially sound options: the export of Eastern 
Mediterranean gas by way of Egypt’s liquefaction 
facilities. Russia is also entering the LNG market with 
the launch of the Yamal’ LNG project. Following its first 
shipping in 2017, it could turn into a major LNG exporter 
to Europe.27
 The EU’s lack of success in diversifying gas supplies is 
not a surprise. Large cross-border megaprojects carry 
significant commercial and geopolitical risks. They 
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call for robust demand prospects and a safe international 
environment. The EU and its members states are neither 
necessarily willing nor able to guarantee both. 
 Demand prospects remain uncertain in light of the 
EU’s decarbonisation agenda. Besides, to compensate 
for Russia’s ‘price dumping’ that deters sound 
competition, more public funding would be needed 
to support diversification. However, given the EU’s 
climate commitments, public support ends up under 
high scrutiny, as demonstrated by the criticism of the 
EIB’s EUR 1 bn loan to TAP. One should also consider 
that current alternative projects, like the Southern 
Gas Corridor, the EastMed or the Baltic Pipe, are set to 
provide a supply that would not be able to significantly 
erode Gazprom’s market share, regardless of any 
preferential treatment they might obtain.
 From a geopolitical standpoint, the EU and its 
member states can hardly guarantee the safety of 
infrastructures and operations in contexts where 
tensions are present. In Eastern Turkey, Kurdish militias 
have repeatedly attacked energy routes running through 
Turkey, namely the Southern Gas Corridor. In the 
Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey did not hesitate to use 
its navy to stop Eni’s exploration activities following 
a dispute on exploitation rights in Cypriot waters. The 
war in Syria has put an end to an EU-supported project 
to ship gas from Egypt to Turkey through Jordan and 
Syria.28 Furthermore, Islamist attacks have repeatedly 
targeted gas pipelines across the Sinai, which are 
expected to ship Eastern Mediterranean gas to Egypt for 
their liquefaction before their export. As for the EastMed 
pipeline,29 the exploitation rights for offshore fields are 
contested, while political standoffs threaten critical 
infrastructure among coastal states and between states 
and non-state actors.
 These cases expose the limits of the EU in 
diversifying gas supply. As a regulatory authority, the EU 
can only achieve diversification through markets. Russia 
can deter alternative supply on a commercial basis, and 
could be prevented to do so only through a reduction 
of Russian capacity – a policy which however would be 
problematic to pursue, as it would, in the end, challenge 
the EU’s energy security in phases when global markets 
undergo tight conditions.
 As a result, instead of diversification, the EU should 
seek to maximise its hand by creating new options. If 
the downward effect of new infrastructures on prices 
outweighs its financial cost, there is a case for supporting 
spare capacity. All in all, the evolution of LNG markets 
toward more liquidity and flexibility provided 
more energy security for Europe and constraints to 
Gazprom than large diversification projects.
 In the end, NS2 will have a differentiated impact 
on the several regions of the IEM as for the prospects 
for diversification. In south-eastern European 
countries (SEECs), the least diversified and most 
fragmented and vulnerable section of the EU’s gas market, 
NS2 will have a much lower impact than the expansion of 
its sister project in the south, Turkish Stream, in terms of 
challenging the rationale for diversification.
 
 In NWE markets, NS2 will deter the competition from 
LNG: Gazprom can use the expanded capacity to flood the 
EU market, let prices tumble and thus cut the ground from 
under competitors’ feet.
 In CEE, the picture remains unclear due to the 
uncertainty regarding Gazprom’s marketing strategy. 
Assuming that Gazprom would re-route its east-west 
LTCs on NS2, CEECs may lose access to non-Russian gas 
from their western neighbours because of the resulting 
west-east congestion. The segmentation of the internal 
market would reinforce the rationale for opening new 
entry points to the CEE regional market. If NS2 goes 
ahead, Kotek et al. (2017) forecast a significant rise in 
the net present value and benefit/cost ratio of several 
gas diversification projects. The net present worth of the 
LNG terminal in Krk would rise by 129% and the Greece-
Bulgaria Interconnector by 338%. It could also spur 
further interconnection between CEECs and SEECs.30
 
 However, if Gazprom commits to providing 
competitive prices and contracts (in alignment with 
the conclusions of the EU antitrust investigation), 
alternative assets will not be used, and consumers will 
bear the costs (Chyong 2017). All in all, NS2 might not 
necessarily deter the rationale to build alternative 
infrastructures – but could make it more expensive.
2.3  RECOMMENDATIONS
 On an aggregate level, one should not overestimate 
NS2’s direct impact on the EU’s energy security. 
Economically, the EU can build on sufficient optionality 
in most of its territory, and the most vulnerable areas of 
the internal energy market only call for relatively small 
interventions. Politically, any accidental or intentional 
Even if additional export capacity 
for Russian gas is not good news for 
alternative routes, the EU’s poor record in 
gas diversification has other political and 
commercial motivations. 
Large cross-border megaprojects carry 
significant commercial and geopolitical 
risks. They call for robust demand 
prospects and a safe international 
environment. The EU is neither necessarily 
willing nor able to guarantee both. 
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supply disruption would push Europe towards 
accelerating the phasing out of natural gas in the  
medium to long run. Nevertheless, by depriving several 
CEECs of their transit role, NS2 could expose them 
to political blackmail from Moscow. Strategically, the 
concentration of sizeable capacity on one single route 
can be a security concern, unless both Russia and the 
EU can divert Nord Stream flows through other routes 
if an accident occurs. Risk mitigation calls for keeping 
Ukraine’s corridor operational.
 The EU has a poor record in diversifying its gas 
routes. But NS2 can make the situation worse. First 
and foremost, it can create uncertain or unfavourable 
conditions for investment in alternative projects. 
Within the EU, this impact will be unevenly distributed. 
In CEE, it will depend on Gazprom’s pricing and 
contractual strategies. All in all, if Gazprom 
aggressively defends its market shares, NS2 would 
worsen the business case for diversification efforts.
 To mitigate the abovementioned risks to its  
energy security, the EU should adopt the following 
additional recommendations:
1 q Update the stress tests. The EU should 
perform new stress tests taking into account the 
construction of NS2 and the various scenarios 
regarding the usability of Ukraine’s GTS. Stress 
tests should also consider different scenarios 
regarding the global supply of LNG. Since 2008,  
the EU has built on the abundant supply of LNG 
to fuel a growing perception of resilience to 
supply shocks. Such an abundance, however, is 
not necessarily here to stay. Several studies have 
already pointed out that small emerging markets 
might help to drain the glut (Kott and Losz 2017), 
while the rapidly expanding Chinese and Indian 
regasification capacity may absorb supply in  
the future.
2 q Get diversification right. If NS2 helps Gazprom’s  
to consolidate its market position, the 
diversification of routes and suppliers will become 
paramount to guarantee adequate levels of security 
and competition. The expansion of Russian 
capacity, however, would risk making investments 
in diversification more expansive and exposed to 
the risk of going stranded. As such, interventions 
should be limited to small, critical interconnectors 
and flexible infrastructures such as floating  
storage and regasification units (FSRU) – LNG 
vessels that can act as both ships and onshore 
installations. These could prove pivotal in 
improving optionality in the most vulnerable 
segments of the EU market.31 
 Any infrastructure effort should involve careful 
planning to ensure that it brings net positive welfare 
to consumers, even when used only partially. In 
light of the EU’s decarbonisation objectives, the risk 
of carbon lock-in or asset stranding should not be 
overlooked when EU financial support is provided.  
Aid should go to new gas infrastructures on the 
condition that they could serve in future for the 
transport and storage of renewable gas (biogas and 
RES-based hydrogen and synthetic gas).
 Part of the resources for energy security should  
be diverted to diversify energy sources and boost 
demand reduction.
 At the same time, energy diplomacy efforts should  
be devoted to promoting reform of the energy sector 
among leading suppliers, and promoting international 
principles of energy governance together with other 
significant importers to support well-supplied, liquid,  
and flexible LNG markets, which proved way more 
effective in constraining Gazprom’s market power 
and political leverage than command-and-control 
diversification policies.
3. A legal and political perspective
 The extent to which NS2 complies with EU law has 
been the subject of controversy. This section first assesses 
whether NS2 complies with the main principles of the EU 
Gas Directive. It then discusses the applicability or not of 
the EU Gas Directive to NS2. It also considers the pros and 
cons of giving the European Commission the mandate to 
settle the legal regime of the offshore section of NS2 with 
Russia and amendments to the Gas Directive to extend 
the application of EU law to all import pipelines. Finally, it 
discusses the project’s political dimension in light of the 
EU’s Energy Union initiative. Political frictions are rising 
within the EU as well as between Germany and the United 
States, with significant implications for the EU and US 
policies towards Ukraine.
3.1  NS2 AND THE THIRD ENERGY PACKAGE
 According to the Gas Directive, pipelines can 
be of three sorts: there are transmission pipelines 
(pipelines connecting two network systems), upstream 
pipelines (pipelines that are part of or connected 
to a production project), and distribution pipelines 
(pipelines connecting the system to the end consumers). 
The Directive does not apply to the latter two. But NS2 
mainly qualifies as a transmission pipeline: it does  
not run directly from a field and it connects two  
network systems.
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Here, EU and national legislation would only apply 
in line with environmental and resource exploitation 
provisions under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, many experts 
argue that a pipeline cannot be subject to different legal 
regimes between EU and non-EU territory and therefore 
call for an extraterritorial extension of EU law (Dudek 
2017) to the whole pipeline.
 Building on the same assumptions, the German 
regulator, Bundesnetzagentur, came to the opposite 
conclusion. Given that the onshore section of NS2 is tiny 
compared to the offshore part, and that separate legal 
regimes cannot apply to the same project, it concluded that 
the application of TEP would be inappropriate.33 On the 
offshore section, the argumentation goes, the same regime 
as for other pipelines should apply. A few precedents 
support this interpretation. Intergovernmental agreements 
between the supplier and importer country define the 
legal systems of African pipelines such as Green Stream 
and Medgaz. Nord Stream 1, however, is not the subject 
of an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA). The European 
Commission and member states avoided considering 
whether EU law should apply.
 Others oppose this approach based on the precedent 
of the Yamal pipeline, whose section on EU territory 
was fully aligned with the Union’s regulatory regime 
– suggesting the retroactivity of the TEP (Riley 2016). 
Consequently, Nord Stream 1 should not be exempt from 
EU law. Others defended the Commission’s inactivity on 
Nord Stream 1 on the basis that the project was initially 
intended to ship gas from the Shtokman field to the EU, 
thus qualifying as an upstream pipeline, even though  
the EU never acknowledged its upstream status 
(Offenberg 2016). Another relevant point is that, if the 
TEP is theoretically applicable to Nord Stream 1, the  
EU ignored the legal regime applying to this pipeline for 
political reasons.
 All in all, the jury is still out until the European 
Court of Justice gives its interpretation, as the only 
authoritative body to provide an EU-wide final legal 
perspective. Opinions of national regulators still need 
to abide by a commitment to look at energy security 
from a national perspective, while the European 
Commission openly clarified to have a clear political 
stake when stating that the “Commission does not like 
Nord Stream 2 politically”.34
 
3.3   A NEGOTIATION MANDATE: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS
 The Commission’s legal service found that EU 
law had not foreseen mechanisms to achieve the Gas 
Directive’s competition and transparency objectives 
with regard to pipelines connecting member states with 
third countries (such as Nord Stream). However, as it is 
not possible to apply different regulatory regimes to the 
same pipeline, the Commission concluded that there is 
a conflict of law in the EEZ section of the pipeline that 
requires international negotiation.35 On June 2017, it 
asked member states for a mandate to negotiate with 
The Gas Directive 2009/73
The Gas Directive 2009/73, which is part of the Third Energy 
Package, remains the most relevant EU legislation when it 
comes to gas infrastructures. Its main principles are:
q    Ownership unbundling or the separation between the 
network ownership, which can belong to a transmission 
system operator (TSO) or an independent system operator 
(ISO), from the production and transport operations.
q    Third party access (or the obligation of a pipeline operator  
to grant access to competitors on equal grounds.
q    Non-discriminatory tariff setting or the obligation to set 
tariffs that are transparent and applied with no discrimination.
Exemptions can still be granted (Art 36) in case:
 
(i)   a new infrastructure enhances competition and security 
     of supply;
(ii)   the waiver is a pre-condition for the investment to take place;
(iii) charges must be levied; or
(iv)  the exemption should not be detrimental to competition or 
the effective functioning of the internal market for natural 
gas,	or	the	efficient	functioning	of	the	regulated	system	to	
which the pipeline is connected.
The	European	Commission	holds	the	final	say	on	accepting	 
or rejecting the exemption application.
 According to the box above, NS2 appears incompatible 
with the 2009 Gas Directive. Following the withdrawal 
of the European partners from the consortium in 2016, 
Gazprom is the only owner.32 Third Party Access (TPA) 
cannot be guaranteed due to Russian legislation, which 
gives Gazprom a monopoly on exports via pipelines 
(Dudek 2017). The non-discriminatory tariff setting also 
makes little sense if TPA does not apply.
 On exemption grounds, NS2 also looks problematic. 
Considering the EU definition of security of supply, the 
Commission can hardly exempt a pipeline allowing 
Gazprom to consolidate and expand its market  
position. By rejecting the applicability of EU legislation, 
the project promoters have made it clear that the 
investment is going ahead with or without the EU’s 
consent. Such evident incompatibility with the EU  
Gas Directive helps to understand why most of the  
legal controversy surrounding NS2 focuses on the 
applicability of EU legislation.
3.2   DIVERGING VIEWS ON THE REMIT  
OF THE THIRD ENERGY PACKAGE
 The Third Energy Package (TEP) has been the subject 
of many legal interpretations.
 The EU legal framework fully applies within the EU 
territory, which includes 88 km of Danish territorial 
waters and 50 km of German land territory, internal 
waters and territorial waters). This raises questions 
about the regime that applies to the Nord Stream 
section running outside EU waters, notably in the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of coastal states.  
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Russia an intergovernmental agreement that defines the 
applicable regime.36
 A unanimous backing of the mandate by member 
states, conditioning the expansion of the pipeline 
to the extension of EU rules, would provide the 
opportunity to institutionalise energy relations 
between Europe and Russia, in line with the EU’s 
traditional objective to align third countries’ regulation 
to its own. More specifically, Moscow would have to 
ensure the independent ownership of the infrastructure 
and reign in Gazprom’s pipeline export monopoly 
(partial dismantling). Of course, Russia could refuse to 
negotiate. However, a Russian refusal to bargain, should 
the mandate be approved, would leave Germany with no 
other option but to walk out of NS2. This outcome would 
be far worse for Russia than engaging in negotiations. 
 In a different scenario, the Council might reject 
the mandate as a result of the opposition of Germany 
and other countries supportive of NS2 such as Austria  
and the Netherlands. This outcome would deprive  
the Commission of any legal and political legitimacy 
(Yafimava 2017). Such a scenario would be detrimental  
to the EU’s credibility in the energy field. 
3.4   AMENDING THE GAS DIRECTIVE: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS
 In late 2017, the Commission also proposed to amend 
the Gas Directive in a way that would make it more 
difficult for Russia to refuse to negotiate.
 The Commission’s proposal extends its definition 
of an interconnector – currently applied to intra-
EU cross-border pipelines – to all pipelines between 
member states and third countries up to the border of 
the EU’s jurisdiction. In effect, this would extend to 
such cross-border pipelines all the rules on unbundling, 
non-discrimination, transparency and TPA as well as 
eligibility for EU funding. Member states would be 
required to ensure that all new infrastructures with a 
cross-border dimension are fully compatible with the 
Gas Directive, and to cooperate with third countries’ 
authorities to this end. As the proposal would apply to 
existing infrastructure as well, a derogation regime is 
foreseen as long as its application is temporary and not 
detrimental to competition or security of supply.
 If the directive revision enters into force before 
the construction of NS2, such a pipeline would not be 
eligible for a derogation, but for a standard exemption 
under the existing Gas Directive provision – whose 
conditions, as mentioned before, would make NS2 
hardly eligible.
 The Commission’s amendments would provide 
Gazprom with an incentive to negotiate an 
intergovernmental agreement that would prevail 
over the Gas Directive. If adopted, the amended 
Directive would ideally strengthen the chances for a 
negotiation that would put NS2 (at least partly) in line 
with the EU regulatory regime.
 However, such a proposal contains risks too. The 
possibility of triggering a new wave of negotiations 
between member states and several foreign suppliers 
could negatively interfere with ongoing processes 
aiming to reform the energy sector in these countries. 
Algeria is a relevant case. It has been struggling recently 
to attract new investments to develop its oil and gas 
sector. Today, it needs to meet a surge in domestic 
gas demand against a backdrop of falling production. 
Before the end of 2018, the country plans to reform its 
energy law to make the investment environment more 
attractive to foreign – notably European – firms.
A unanimous backing of the mandate by 
member states, conditioning the expansion 
of the pipeline to the extension of EU 
rules, would provide the opportunity to 
institutionalise energy relations between 
Europe and Russia.
 Egypt is undergoing a similar process. Changing the 
rules for exporting gas in the midst of a reform process 
will be hardly appreciated by these exporters. Not to 
mention Libya, where the current political chaos would 
provide little indication on who will renegotiate Green 
Stream’s operational regime. 
 However, assuming that the scenario of the approval  
of the Gas Directive review by the Council materialises  
and puts an end to the legal dispute, issues about the 
political impact of NS2 would be far from solved. Even if 
the project could change the aspects that go against EU 
rules – a change for which the EU would have leverage if 
member states accepted to provide a legal and political 
backing – NS2 would remain politically problematic.
3.5  THE POLITICAL DIMENSION
 Regardless of any legal assessment, the NS2 pipeline 
discussion is taking place in a particular political moment, 
considering Russia’s annexation and destabilisation of part 
of Ukraine’s territory, hostile cyber-activities, the spread 
of online misinformation to influence elections in western 
countries, and particular activism in the Middle East in a 
direction not positive for European interests.
 Moreover, NS2 is in contradiction with several of the 
political objectives of the Energy Union Communication 
and the Energy Diplomacy Action Plan endorsed by the 
Council.37 Both documents stress that the EU must  
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(i) diversify energy sources, suppliers and routes;  
(ii) maintain a transit role for Ukraine; and (iii) make energy 
partnerships consistent with relevant foreign policy goals.
 As regards diversification, we have explained in 
section 2 how the expansion of Russian capacity would 
consolidate its position in the EU market.
 Regarding the transit role of Ukraine, NS2 would 
significantly diminish it. Ukraine would thus lose transit 
revenues estimated at EUR 2 bn per year. It would also 
struggle to buy gas from the EU due to the possible 
congestion of West-East routes as a result of NS2. Ukraine 
would thus rely more heavily on Gazprom’s supply from 
the East (Zachmann 2018). 
 As for the EU, its economic interest is to continue gas 
transit through Ukraine. First, the Ukrainian GTS is the 
only transit corridor for Russian gas to the EU that is not 
under Gazprom’s control. Second, Ukraine is part of the 
Energy Community Treaty, which foresees regulatory 
approximation of the Ukrainian energy legislation to the 
EU. Finally, Ukraine has at its disposal a storage capacity 
which is much larger than the rest of Central and Eastern 
Europe, which could be an energy security asset for the 
region (Wieczorkiewicz and Genoese 2014). In strategic 
terms, the EU has a lot to lose from the loss of Ukraine 
as a transit route, given that the country’s transit role 
poses a constraint to Russia’s foreign policy options 
towards Kiev. Any further weakening of Ukraine is 
against Europe’s interests. The EU would potentially 
have to confront a further degradation of its security 
situation, the cost of which is impossible to gauge at  
this stage. 
escalate tensions as any worsening of the dispute would 
prompt Western European buyers (notably Austrian and 
German ones) to support an expansion of Nord Stream 
to avoid the Ukrainian transit route. All in all, the simple 
idea of Nord Stream’s expansion alters the balance 
of power between Gazprom and Naftogaz in favour 
of the former, with the consequence of undermining 
the facilitation and deal-brokering role the European 
Commission has been playing between the two firms.
 NS2 also yields a divisive political impact on intra-
EU relations. In general terms, Northwestern European 
countries – relying on diversified gas markets – mainly see 
Nord Stream as an additional way to mitigate a possible 
tightening of the global LNG markets. CEECs instead tend to 
look at NS2 as yet another attempt by Russia to use energy 
policy for political purposes and to consolidate Gazprom’s 
grip on their isolated and poorly diversified markets.
 To date, a profound rift has emerged between 
Germany and Poland, which hold opposing views on 
energy security. Germany tends to frame the latter 
in economic terms and considers hosting a gas entry 
point as an opportunity to serve a more substantial 
portion of the internal energy market. However, political 
considerations also play a role. Germany pursues a 
geo-economic strategy and sees economic success 
as a vital component of its external influence (Szabo 
2014). Business and political elites close to the Social 
Democratic Party have been historically supportive 
of a strategic rapprochement with Russia, stressing 
the complementarity of the two economies – an 
export-driven economy with a strong manufacturing 
base and a resource-rich economy craving for know-
how and consumers goods. Such a view holds that 
economic exchange reduces the need for foreign policy 
assertiveness. Hence, further commercial integration 
between Europe and Russia would tilt the balance 
between security and economic interests in favour of the 
latter. Recent history, however, suggests that this hardly 
applies to Russia, where the interests of security and 
business circles are strongly correlated, especially in the 
energy sector.
 On the other hand, Poland sees energy issues as part 
of a broader geostrategic framework (Gawlikowska-Fyk et 
al. 2017) where security concerns play a significant role in 
defining the country’s economic interests. In a nutshell, 
Warsaw does not believe that the market and solidarity 
mechanisms of the IEM can guarantee its energy 
security (Giuli 2017). In 2016, seven CEECs and SEECs 
wrote a joint letter to the Commission’s Vice-President 
responsible for the Energy Union, in which they stressed 
that NS2 could worsen energy geopolitics in Europe.40 
Their representatives often criticise Germany’s double 
standards when it comes to European solidarity.41 They 
consider Nord Stream as part of an undesired geostrategic 
rapprochement between Germany and Russia (Westphal 
and Lang 2017). Still, Poland’s criticism of NS2 is not 
solely geopolitical. The country also aims to become 
a regional linchpin of diversification through its LNG 
terminal in Świnojuście. Its five bcm capacity is set to 
expand to 7.5 bcm by 2022. Poland also aims at importing 
five bcm of gas from Norway through Denmark thanks to 
 An example of how NS2 could remove constraints 
on Russia’s political manoeuvring was evident in the 
2018 ruling of the Stockholm arbitration court, which 
terminated a longstanding commercial dispute between 
Gazprom and Naftogaz in favour of the latter.38 Without 
NS2 in the picture, Russia would have had no option but 
to maintain a conciliatory stance vis-à-vis the ruling. 
However, the plans to circumvent the Ukrainian route 
through NS2 enabled Gazprom to take more assertive 
steps. It immediately announced that it would start 
procedures to terminate transit through Ukraine.39 
Within the current context, Gazprom has an incentive to 
Even if the project could change  
the aspects that go against EU rules –  
a change for which the EU would have 
leverage if member states accepted to 
provide a legal and political backing – NS2 
would remain politically problematic.
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Russia’s geostrategic ambitions. On the diplomatic 
front, Macron is spending significant political capital to 
reassure the US about France’s commitment as a security 
partner, and to counter President Trump’s dismissive 
characterisation of the EU as a proxy for German 
interests. The French leader could logically become more 
critical towards NS2, but there has been no evidence of 
this so far. While Macron is usually outspoken about 
the EU’s actorness as an amplifier of French climate 
diplomacy, his position on fuel security remains unclear.
 Among the Nordic countries, Sweden and Denmark 
raise security concerns related to the stationing 
of Russian personnel on their islands during the 
construction of NS2. The Danish Parliament recently 
approved a law enabling the government to halt the 
project in case national security concerns arise.44 A 
trilemma, however, appears for Denmark. While the 
country is usually close to US security interests, it is  
also profoundly integrated with Germany. Denmark  
might also be reluctant to support any change of 
framework that questions the UNCLOS’ primacy – as 
such a convention can also serve as a shield to prevent 
Russian territorial claims in the Arctic region. Finland 
shares the same German/Austrian insistence on the fact 
that the project should not be politicised (Gotkowska and 
Szymanski 2016).
 Its growing transatlantic dimension also fuels the 
geopolitical complexity of NS2. The US has always declared 
its firm opposition to the project. Since the 1990s, US energy 
diplomacy has been actively supporting diversification 
projects in Eurasia. Initially, it focused its attention on 
the Caspian region, with the double objective to provide 
non-Russian gas to Europe and reduce the former Soviet 
countries’ dependence on Gazprom. More recently, the 
US has been supportive of the development of Eastern 
Mediterranean gas resources. Today, the US opposes NS2 
because it would tighten Russia’s grip on the European 
gas market and provide Moscow with a new pressure 
lever on German political and business elites by way of 
the strengthened interdependence between Russia and 
Germany. Such an outcome would be detrimental to the 
US, who considers Germany as the linchpin of sanctions 
enforcement in Europe at a time when transatlantic 
consensus on sanctions towards Russia is dwindling  
(Ivan 2018).
 Some commercial considerations may also play a role.  
A cancellation of NS2 would lead to a compression of 
Russian export capacity and would make the EU a more 
contestable market for US LNG. Such an argument would 
sound compelling for the current Administration’s 
interest to rebalance the US trade deficits with Europe 
and East Asia.
 The question becomes whether Washington is willing 
and able to act, and, if so, through which channel. 
Regardless of its specific foreign policy priorities 
(often hard to predict because of the erratic current 
foreign policy course of the Administration), the US’ 
new-found gas abundance makes it easier for the US 
to impose sanctions on energy exporters, as American 
hydrocarbons could maintain the global markets well 
The simple idea of Nord Stream’s 
expansion alters the balance of power 
between Gazprom and Naftogaz in favour 
of the former, with the consequence of 
undermining the facilitation and deal-
brokering role the European Commission 
has been playing between the two firms. 
the Baltic Pipe project, which has received EU financial 
support under the Connecting Europe Facility and expects 
a final investment decision by the end of 2018. PGNiG, the 
Polish state-owned gas incumbent, has recently increased 
its investment in Norwegian fields.
 The idea of an East-West divide around NS2 is, 
however, not so straightforward. CEECs are not all in the 
same situation. Slovakia could also lose out as it ships 
most of the flows from Ukraine to Austria’s Baumgarten 
hub. NS2, in connection with the construction of a  
Czech-Austria connection (the BACI pipeline),42 
would diminish the Slovak role, which could be partly 
compensated by shipping gas from the west to Ukraine, 
or the gas coming from Nord Stream to SEE via the 
Eastring pipeline.43 On the contrary, NS2 might give the 
Czech Republic more transit centrality to the detriment 
of Slovakia. In Hungary, a strengthened transit role 
(between CEE and SEE) would compensate potential 
losses in its storage business. The Baltic States, although 
marginally touched by NS2 in commercial terms, join 
Poland in criticising the pipeline on strategic grounds. 
They argue the project could further weaken Ukraine and 
become a political instrument. 
 Other countries are involved as well. Among large 
western European countries, Italy and France are in 
an ambiguous position on the NS2 controversy. Italy 
opposes NS2, as it would further consolidate Italy’s status 
as an end consumer, frustrating its ambition of becoming 
a gas hub for a more extensive market area thanks to 
diversified and expanding infrastructure (De Maio 2016). 
Also, there is a widespread perception among Italian 
politicians that the EU gave different treatment to Nord 
Stream and South Stream, a project supported by Rome 
and led by Eni against which the Commission built up 
a compelling legal case that ultimately led Gazprom to 
cancel the pipeline. Italy has close bilateral relations with 
alternative suppliers in Algeria, Libya, and Egypt. As such, 
it opposes NS2 out of commercial interest, but at the 
same time it is sceptic about the Commission’s quest for 
enhanced actorness and stands against any confrontation 
with Russia on energy matters.
 France is also in a conflict of interests. Whereas Engie 
(a partly state-owned French energy firm) is part of the 
group of European investors in NS2, President Macron 
seems more inclined than his predecessors to contain 
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supplied and reduce the sanctions’ consequences for 
allies (Sullivan 2017). In July 2017, the US Congress 
passed the Countering America’s Adversaries through 
Sanctions Act (CAATSA),45 which enables the President 
to issue sanctions targeting investments that “directly 
and significantly contribute to the enhancement of the 
ability of the Russian Federation to construct energy 
export pipelines”. Despite the ambiguous language of the 
Bill and of the Guidelines issued by the State Department 
regarding its scope of application (Vicari 2018), the US 
has been adamant that NS2 fall under its remit.  
A US envoy clearly said in Brussels that any company 
involved in Russian energy pipelines faced under CAATSA 
an elevated sanctions risk.46 Immediately following 
CAATSA’s approval, the European Commission issued a 
list of projects which would be at risk of being targeted, 
including NS2. Despite the hype, the US conceded that the 
triggering of sanctions would be subject to coordination 
with allies. This decision was the result of European 
lobbying to the House of Representatives, strongly backed 
by an unusually blunt reaction by German Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Sigmar Gabriel and Austrian Chancellor 
Christian Kern. The two politicians stated in a letter that 
US unilateralism on sanctions would have “diminished 
the effectiveness of the two countries’ stance on Ukraine” 
– which is, as mentioned, deeply important for the US. As 
Germany demonstrated to have enough leverage to shield 
its business community from US unilateralism, notably by 
way of its crucial role in the implementation of existing 
sanctions towards Russia, CAATSA may never apply.
geopolitical stakes with NS2 and the US’ role as the 
main guarantor of collective security in Europe, one 
cannot simply dismiss Washington’s opposition 
to NS2 as intrusive. At a time when the US seems 
willing to reconsider its global role, when transatlantic 
cleavages are deepening on issues more vital for Europe’s 
(and Germany’s) interests – such as the future of the 
Iran nuclear deal, the global trade system, and defence 
spending – NS2 adds fuel to the fire. So even if one argues 
for more European strategic autonomy, which might 
among other things imply that the US should not have 
a say on Europe’s energy matters, NS2 is not the right 
point to start. Europe’s lack of strategic autonomy is first 
and foremost the result of diverging preferences between 
EU member states, and a pipeline fostering divisions 
between capitals would further undermine the Union’s 
strategic autonomy. 
 Broader political considerations may have driven a 
recent shift in Chancellor Angela Merkel’s tone on NS2. 
She publicly acknowledged the political dimension of 
the pipeline in April 2018.47 Merkel expressed support for 
maintaining some gas transit through Ukraine, marking 
a departure from the traditional insistence on avoiding 
political meddling in commercial projects. Moscow has 
been showing a conciliatory tone following Merkel’s 
comments, insisting that transit through Ukraine will 
not be phased out. These remarks show that Germany 
is not entirely indifferent to the growing geopolitical 
pressure around NS2 and that western leaders are far 
from powerless regarding this project. However, German 
authorities simultaneously issued the required permits 
for the pipeline project to go ahead, in conformity with 
the administrative procedures and the legalistic approach 
that German government has endorsed so far. In practice, 
it is not clear how Germany intends to guarantee the 
continuation of flows through Ukraine – an objective 
which is attainable only by constraining alternative 
routes for the supply of Russian gas. Once NS2 and 
Turk Stream are operational, Russia will have at its 
disposal enough capacity to circumvent Ukraine. Thus, 
Russia and Germany should turn their pledge to continue 
using this transit route into concrete deeds that should be 
practically and politically sustainable in future.
 In case Berlin is not willing to reconsider the 
appropriateness of NS2, a possible way out of the 
impasse for Germany could be to use its relevance for 
Russian energy and strategic interests to push Moscow 
towards sound behaviour on the political front – 
possibly in coordination with other allies. The fact that the 
German Chancellor has both acknowledged the political 
dimension of NS2 and declared her will to maintain 
transit through Ukraine should now translate into binding 
commitments. For example, the expansion of Nord Stream 
could be conditioned to Russia’s full implementation of the 
Minsk II package.48  Finally, the option of adding ‘merely’ 
one string for Nord Stream, rather than two, should be 
explored. Raising the pipeline’s capacity by 27.5 bcm 
rather than 55 bcm would help keeping the case for transit 
through Ukraine (and Belarus) in the future.
 With NS2 entering more and more into actors’ 
calculations in a wider geopolitical arena, it is doubtful 
 Until CAATSA, the US adopted sanctions in close 
coordination with the EU. Unilateralism on energy-
related sanctions would not prove as potent. It could also 
easily backfire, fostering mistrust between Berlin and 
Washington without significantly affecting the intra-
EU balance of power regarding the NS2 controversy. In 
the aftermath of CAATSA’s adoption, intra-EU divisions 
deepened as Poland, and other CEECs showed support for 
it – as the last hope to prevent NS2 –, while the European 
Commission ended up siding with the promoters of 
NS2 to protect vital European economic interests. 
This development ultimately served the interests of 
Russia, which found another opportunity to stimulate 
transatlantic and intra-European divisions.
 There are good arguments against any unilateral 
approach on sanctions. However, considering the 
The US has always declared its firm 
opposition to the project.  
The question becomes whether 
Washington is willing and able to act, 
and, if so, through which channel. 
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how the EU can play an effective role when it can mainly 
pursue its external energy objectives by way of norms. 
However, even if the Union pursues its external energy 
objectives within a normative context rather than through 
coercive diplomatic means, this does not imply that 
EU policies are void of self-interest. The EU can hardly 
separate regulatory and political considerations. In the 
field of energy, the EU’s objectives are political. Typically, 
the Union discretionarily selects the infrastructures it 
supports financially. The extension of the Gas Directive 
would only be another attempt to make use of regulation 
to exert influence on foreign actors – a widely recognised 
declination of the transformative power of the EU at 
the regional and global stage. Keeping energy relations 
with external suppliers away from the camp of politics 
would be a steep path to follow when foreign suppliers 
are engaged in hostile political actions towards European 
countries, show no desire to move relations towards 
rule-based patterns, and have a proven track record of 
using energy to gain geopolitical advantages against 
EU interests. As such, the EU is right when it politicises 
energy regulations or wants to exert pressure on member 
states that put intra-EU solidarity at risk.
 However, this also shows the limits of EU instruments. 
The debate should not focus on whether the EU should 
choose between being a political or regulatory actor, 
as several commentators maintain (Goldthau 2017). It 
should instead concentrate on the fact that the EU is 
ill-equipped to pursue its political objectives. The EU 
has always been adamant that it has no instruments at 
disposal to stop NS2. The ball is in the member states’ 
camp, and their preferences have not been sufficiently 
put in alignment by the development of the IEM. The 
internal market has not changed member states’ national 
framing of energy security, which is ultimately defined 
by their energy mix, political relations with external gas 
suppliers, and their perceived exclusive responsibility for 
their citizens’ and business’ access to energy. Ultimately, 
the misalignment of external energy interests among 
member states plays as a diminishing factor in the EU’s 
ability to collectively act at international level. At the 
same time, divisions in foreign policy preferences operate 
as a significant stumbling block to the full development of 
a seamless internal market.
3.6  RECOMMENDATIONS
 NS2 is hardly compatible with the EU legislation on gas 
infrastructures in its current form. The application of EU 
law is contested based on conflicting interpretations. For 
the European Commission, the current rules do not specify 
the regulatory framework that should apply to the pipeline. 
It wants, therefore, to negotiate with Russia directly, 
despite opposition from both Moscow and several member 
states. The Council’s support for a mandate and a revision 
of the Gas Directive would enhance the EU’s external 
energy actorness. It would also provide an opportunity for 
aligning Russia’s legislation on both gas infrastructures 
and exports with the EU framework. A refusal by the 
Council would deprive the Commission of the necessary 
political cover to act and would de facto undermine the 
Energy Union.
 Still, any solution to the legal dispute would hardly 
solve the political inconsistency of NS2 with the 
principles of the Energy Union. The impact of NS2 would 
remain geopolitically detrimental for both transatlantic 
relations and intra-EU relations. This situation exposes 
the limits of EU action as a normative power in the field 
of energy relations with third countries. It calls for the EU 
member states to step in and agree on what constitutes 
the Union’s shared external energy interest.
Based on the above, the EU and its members should:
1 q Extend the Gas Directive and give a negotiating 
mandate to the Commission to define a legal 
regime for import pipelines. Intra-EU divisions 
should be overcome through an intra-EU ‘grand 
gas bargain’, where Germany would endorse the 
abovementioned provisions and the CEECs would 
speed up the full implementation of the Third 
Energy Package. Germany can hardly persuade 
CEECs and SEECs to fully open up their markets or 
give up their governments’ grip on the energy sector 
as long as they hold that the internal market puts 
their energy security at risk or threatens to worsen 
their economic conditions. Such a ‘grand bargain’ 
should also set the stage for a future commitment to 
strengthen centralised competences for supervision, 
regulation, and energy security.
2 q Develop a clear and extensive derogation regime 
for existing pipelines and LNG. To avoid alienating 
several of its member states, the EU should also 
provide a generous derogation scheme for existing 
infrastructures, ensuring solid prospects for those 
countries, especially in North Africa, that are 
starting to reform their energy sector. Arguably, 
the regulatory fragmentation resulting from the 
derogation would not be desirable in the long run.
3 q Approve NS2 under specific political conditions. 
France and Germany, as signatories of the Minsk 
II agreement and beneficiaries of NS2, should 
condition the project to the full implementation of 
the Minsk II agreement by Russia. They must secure 
clear and enforceable guarantees on continued 
transit through Ukraine. If Germany were to use 
its economic weight for the benefit of its allies and 
their strategic interests, rather than against them, 
it would reassure CEECs, Ukraine, and the US. A 
compromise solution could also include the addition 
of one string only to Nord Stream, rather than two, 
in order not to expand the pipeline capacity to the 
extent that would lead to the possible end of transit 
through Ukraine. 
4 q Push Ukraine to lower its transit tariffs. Ukraine 
could do more to present itself as an attractive 
transit corridor. Many buyers in Western Europe 
consider NS2 as a viable alternative not only on 
security grounds due to pricing disputes and 
instability but also due to unreliable transit fees and 
slow progress with unbundling. The EU should exert 
its influence over Ukraine to persuade Kiev that a 
foreseen rise in transit gas fees would strengthen 
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the commercial case for NS2. If the objective is to 
maintain transit through Ukraine, the GTS should 
provide Gazprom with the same commercial  
agility to counter the LNG competition that  
NS2 would grant.
5 q Insert import infrastructures in the National 
Energy and Climate Plans. Considering the impact 
of flow diversions as a result of the construction 
of a significant pipeline such as NS2, it should 
be mandatory for the landing country to hold 
consultations with all countries potentially affected. 
In case a common understanding cannot be reached, 
the EU should have the authority to step in. Ideally, 
ACER would get the final word. Granting the arbiter 
role to an independent agency rather than to the 
Commission would be less politically divisive. The 
2020 review of the gas package should strengthen 
its position. Consultations should take place within 
the framework of the National Energy and Climate 
Plans (NECPs) proposed in the Commission’s 2016 
Governance Regulation.
Conclusions
 This paper analysed the likely commercial, security, 
legal, and political impact of NS2 on the EU from a 
European perspective. The debate about NS2 is taking 
place in a relaxed energy environment from a global 
demand and supply perspective. Nevertheless, given the 
poor state of relations with Russia, the political context 
is charged.
 
 Economically, it is Gazprom’s future marketing 
strategy that will determine the impact of NS2 on 
prices, competition or the EU’s overall energy security. 
Not defined to this date, Gazprom usually defines its 
strategy in reaction to exogenous variables related to 
global market conditions (which remain unknown). All 
in all, remarkable advancements in the EU’s regulatory 
framework and infrastructure network – together with a 
period of benign market conditions and the introduction 
of flexible gas trading technologies – have significantly 
reduced Gazprom’s ability to abuse its dominant market 
position. The EU has strengthened its hand. Some 
stronger enforcement and minor adjustment in the 
Union’s gas market design would probably be enough to 
tackle the commercial and security risks linked to NS2, 
although the political will for adopting these additional 
steps remains unclear. 
 Nevertheless, one cannot separate these technical 
considerations from the overall political picture. Recent 
developments seem to lead to a world order where 
transactional power politics take precedence over the 
promotion of multilateral rule-based systems. The 
EU needs to adopt a flexible approach that combines 
support for the primacy of norms as a preferred option 
in external relations and backing of more traditional 
hard power instruments when needed.
 NS2 exposes the way to go for the EU to turn energy 
from a weakness into a strength. The internal energy 
market is ten years old. Despite the addition of a focus 
on energy security, it has not yet managed to align 
member states on their external supply options. If 
Russia can no longer ‘rule’ the EU gas market – as a 
result of heightened competition and unfavourable 
court rulings – it can still ‘divide’. Member states are 
still competing against each other to become gas 
hubs, or they do not trust the IEM’s price or solidarity 
mechanisms as instruments to ensure energy security.  
The EU has limited instruments to bridge these 
divergences. Energy security became a shared 
competence since the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, but who would be ultimately responsible for that 
is still an unsolved matter of interpretation. The internal 
energy market has the ambition to become ‘single’ but 
does not yet have an established joint regulator. While 
energy remains a shared competence, member states 
have no obligation to consider the European interest 
when selecting their foreign suppliers.
 All this suggest that rather than a ‘grand bargain’ 
between the EU and Russia (the timing of which  
seems questionable), a ‘grand energy bargain’ is first 
needed within the EU. In a nutshell, the Energy  
Union is more the start of a long journey than a 
‘mission accomplished’.
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